3 the reduced form effect of winning the lottery.
The last part of the paper presents a fiscal and cost-benefit analysis of the voucher program. Most lottery winners would have attended private school anyway, at least for a few years, and therefore reduced their educational expenditure in response to the program. On the other hand, voucher winners who were induced to switch from public to private schools greatly increased their educational expenditure, since the voucher covered only about half the cost of private school. On balance, winners' gross school fees exceeded those of losers by about 70% of the amount they received from the voucher. This increase comes from the discrete jump in fees for those who switched from public to private schools, and from the fact that winners who would have gone to private school anyway spent more on school fees, possibly because they went to better schools. Moreover, lottery winners worked less, so that, on balance, households winning the lottery actually devoted more resources to education than the voucher face value. We also estimate that the voucher program cost the government about $24 more per winner than the cost of creating a public school placement.
These costs to participants and the government are likely to have been outweighed by the benefits of the voucher to participants --in the form of the economic return to increased educational attainment and test scores.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides background on education in Colombia and describes the PACES program in more detail. Section II discusses data and presents descriptive statistics from our survey. Section III discusses the effect of the program on school choice and basic educational outcomes.
Section IV reports the effect of winning a voucher on test scores and non-education outcomes. Section V discusses the use of lottery win/loss status as an instrument to identify the causal effect of receiving a scholarship. Finally, Section VI looks at the effect of the program on household and government expenditure, and compares program costs with the benefits to participants. 2 PACES was launched in November 1991 with advertisements in print and on radio soliciting applicants in participating cities (Calderon, 1996) . A World Bank (1993) report on Colombian secondary schools notes that most schools operated 2 or 3 shifts and that some towns have little room for additional pupils in spite of projected enrollment growth. Other problems mentioned in the report include poor primary-school preparation, weak school management, lack of teacher preparedness, lack of textbooks, and shortages of other supplemental materials. The early 1990s was a general period of reform and liberalization in Colombia; see, for example, Kugler (1999) .
I. Background
The Colombian government established the PACES program in late 1991 as part of a wider decentralization effort and in an attempt to expand private provision of public services (King et al, 1997) .
The program, which was partly funded by the World Bank, was also motivated as an effort to quickly expand school capacity and to raise secondary school enrollment rates (King, Orazem, and Wolgemuth, 1998). 2 Although 89% of Colombia's primary-school age children were enrolled in 1993, only 75% of the eligible population was enrolled in secondary schools. Among children of eligible age in the poorest quintile of the population, 78% were enrolled in primary school, but only 55% were enrolled in secondary school (Sanchez and Mendez, 1995;  note that secondary school covers grades 6-11 in Colombia.)
The PACES program targeted low-income families by offering vouchers only to children residing in neighborhoods classified as falling into the two lowest socioeconomic strata (out of 6 possible strata).
Applicants had to submit a utility bill to establish residential location and voucher eligibility. A second important feature of program targeting was that vouchers were offered only to children attending public primary schools. This restriction further excluded upper-income households since almost half of children from the richest income quintile attended private primary schools. Studies by Morales-Cobo (1993) and Ribero and Tenjo (1997) suggests that the targeting was largely effective in Bogota.
PACES vouchers were worth only about US$190 at the time of our survey. The maximum voucher value was set initially to correspond to the average tuition of low-to-middle cost private schools in Colombia's three largest cities. Schools charging less than the vouchers' face value received only their usual tuition.
PACES vouchers became less generous over time because they did not keep up with inflation, and hence recipients had to supplement vouchers with additional payments to cover school fees. Our survey data show 3 Background information in this section is taken from King et al (1997) , Calderon (1996) , and unpublished ICETEX documents. 4 Problems were reported with low-quality schools created to exploit the vouchers. But Calderon (1996) notes that even before the non-profit restriction was imposed, only 15% of Bogota's voucher students attended such institutions. 5 matriculation and monthly fees for private schools attended by voucher applicants in 1998 averaged about $340. By way of comparison, the average annual per-pupil public expenditure in Colombia's public secondary school system in 1995 was just over $350 (DNP, 1999) , and public school parents in our sample typically had to pay tuition or fees of roughly $58. Per capita GNP in Colombia is now around $2,280 (World Bank, 1999) .
To qualify for a voucher, applicants must have been entering the Colombian secondary school cycle which begins with grade 6, and be aged 15 or under. They must also have been admitted to a participating secondary school (i.e., one that would accept the voucher). 3 Participating schools had to be located in participating towns, which included all of Colombia's largest cities. Just under half of private schools in the 10 largest cities accepted vouchers in 1993.
Participating schools tended to serve lower-income pupils, and to have lower tuition than nonparticipating private schools. Schools with a vocational curriculum were also over-represented among those in the program. Initially, vouchers were good at both for-profit and non-profit schools, but after 1996, forprofit schools were excluded. 4 The number of vouchers in use in any one year peaked at roughly 90,000 in 1994 and 1995. There were approximately 3.1 million secondary school pupils in Colombia in 1995, 37% of whom attended private schools. In Bogota, roughly 58% of 567,000 secondary school pupils attended private school.
Test score comparisons reported by King et al (1997) show achievement levels in participating private schools were very close to those in public schools, though significantly below achievement levels in nonparticipating private schools. Similarly, pupil-teacher ratios and facilities were similar in public and participating private schools, while non-participating private schools had lower pupil-teacher ratios and the 6 best facilities. Clearly, then, relatively elite private schools opted-out of the PACES program. One reason for this may have been a reluctance to interact with the bureaucracy in the Colombian Institute for Education, Credit and Training Abroad (ICETEX), a government agency that ran the program. Moreover, vouchers were insufficient to cover much of the tuition at more expensive schools, and some school managers probably viewed the prospect of an influx of pupils from low-income backgrounds as undesirable. On the other hand, many private schools in Colombia serving low-income populations apparently welcomed the PACES program.
Voucher recipients were eligible for automatic renewal through eleventh grade, when Colombian high school ends, provided the recipient's academic performance warranted promotion to the next grade. Students failing a grade were supposed to be dropped from the PACES program. Figures from Calderon (1996) show that, on average, 77% of recipients renewed their vouchers, and estimates from our data are similar. By way of comparison, the national high school promotion rate was about 70%. Students who transferred from one participating private school to another could, in principle, transfer the voucher to the new school. In practice, however, our survey suggests many students who transferred schools after winning lost their vouchers.
Cities and towns used lotteries to allocate vouchers when demand exceeded supply. Municipal governments paid 20% of the voucher cost, while the central government paid 80%. Each municipality decided how many vouchers to fund, subject to a maximum allocated to towns by the central government.
This allocation was determined by estimating the shortfall between primary school enrollment and the available space in public secondary schools. Voucher award rates therefore varied considerably by city and year, depending on the ratio of applicants to available vouchers. Regional ICETEX offices worked with individual municipalities to determine the number of vouchers to be funded, to check school requirements for participation, and to monitor implementation of the program. The Bogota ICETEX office provided software and instructions to regional offices for the purposes of random selection of applicants in cases of oversubscription. We obtained copies of lists of lottery winners and losers from ICETEX offices. 5 6 The data appendix provides additional information about the survey. 7 II. The Applicant Survey
A. Descriptive Statistics
Beginning in the summer of 1998, we interviewed roughly 1,600 PACES applicants, stratifying to obtain approximately equal numbers of winners and losers. Interviewing was limited to the 1995 and 1997 applicant cohorts from Bogota and the 1993 applicant cohort from Jamundi, a suburb of Cali. These years and cities were chosen for a combination of scientific and practical reasons. The largest and longest-running voucher program was in Bogota, and our survey team is based there. Cali is Colombia's second largest city and therefore also important, but almost no Cali applicants had phones, so we concentrated on a suburb, Jamundi. Telephones were used for the majority of interviews, primarily to reduce costs, but also because of interviewer safety and logistical considerations. In principle, the lottery was random within localities and conditional on whether households have access to a telephone (even if it is a neighbor's phone). The results should therefore yield internally valid estimates of the causal effect of the program on voucher applicants with access to a telephone in surveyed cities. Over 80% of applicants had access to a phone, and in the Bogota 1995 cohort, 88% had access to a phone. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sampling frame, attempted contacts and completed interviews. 6 There were 6,156 applicants in the three applicant cohorts of interest. We attempted to interview almost 3,000 applicants, obtaining an overall response rate of 54% and a response rate of almost 61% for the 1997 Bogota lottery. The higher response rate in the most recent lottery is not surprising since contact information for 1997 applicants is more recent. Interviews were completed with 55% of lottery winners and 53% of lottery losers. Although this response rate is far from ideal, the fact that winners and losers were almost equally likely to be interviewed is encouraging because the question of sample selection bias turns on whether voucher status is correlated with response probabilities (see, e.g., Angrist, 1997) . Because response probabilities are virtually uncorrelated with voucher status, there should be little bias from our failure to 7 The vast majority of non-responders were people we could not reach by telephone, either because they had moved or because the telephone number we had no longer worked. Roughly 3% of families contacted refused to answer. The only significant difference in response rates by win/loss status is for the Jamundi cohort. In what follows, we present results for the Bogota 1995 cohort and the combined cohorts separately. Complete follow-up is the holy grail of education research. Even careful evaluation studies using randomized and quasi-randomized designs (e.g., Rouse, 1998; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001) are based on samples with substantial loss to follow-up. Similarly, Howell et al (2000) report follow-up rates similar to ours for US voucher trials in three cities. 8 Plausible IDs have 11 digits, the first 6 of which record birth dates. Correct ID numbers satisfy an equation involving a control digit and the other 10 digits. Random deviations, say, because of incomplete recording, transposition of digits, or errors in a single digit, fail to satisfy this algorithm with very high probability. The check formula is as follows. Let the jth digit be d j , for j=1,10 and d 11 be the control digit. Let {c j ; j=1,11} be the sequence 8 interview all applicants. 7
The typical applicant was about 13 years old at the time of application, while average age on the survey date varied from 13 for 1997 applicants to 17 for 1993 applicants. About half of the applicants were male. Roughly 85% of applicants were still in school, enrolled in grades ranging from 6th for the 1997 cohort to 8th or 9th for the 1993 cohort. The descriptive statistics also show that almost 90% of the applicants we interviewed started 6th grade in private school. This reflects the fact that eligibility for PACES vouchers was conditional on admission to a participating private school. Thus, most lottery losers went to private school anyway, at least for one year. On the other hand, only 63% of applicants were still in private school as of the survey date.
B. Personal Characteristics and Voucher Status
There is little evidence of any association between win/loss status and the individual characteristics measured in our data from Bogota, although winners and losers are less comparable in the 1993 Jamundi cohort. This can be seen in Table 2 , which reports means and differences by win/loss status for all applicants in the study population, for sampled applicants, and for the sample of completed surveys. The sampling process began with lists showing applicant ID numbers, names, addresses, and phone numbers, separately for winners and losers. To obtain demographic characteristics for all applicants, whether surveyed or not, we imputed applicant age using ID numbers (which incorporate birthdays). We note, however, that our strategy of imputing ages is subject to error since 13% of applicants have invalid ID numbers. 8 We excluded {5,4,3,2,7,6,5,4,3,2,1} . Then MOD{[3 j c j d j ]/11}=0 establishes the ID number is valid. 9 observations in which the applicant was younger than 9 or older than 25. In practice, this restriction affected few observations. A second variable from the applicant record is gender. We used first names to assign sex for about 80% of the applicants. A final variable from the applicant record is a dummy for whether the record included a phone number.
Winners and losers have similar telephone access, age, and sex mix in the 1995 and 1997 Bogota data.
As a further check on randomness, we compared win rates by school in those schools with more than 20 applicants to city averages in the Bogota data from 1995. No school had a win rate that differed significantly from the city average. In the Jamundi-93 sample, however, there are significant differences in average age and gender by win/loss status. Because the differences between winners and losers in the Jamundi lottery may indicate non-random assignment of vouchers, and because the 1997 Bogota cohort is too recent for a good reading on some outcomes, we present results from the Bogota-95 sample separately from the results for the pooled sample including all three cohorts.
III. Impact on Scholarship Use, School Choice, and Schooling
Our estimates of lottery effects are based on the following regression model:
where y ic is the dependent variable for child i from application cohort c (defined by city and year); X i represents a vector of individual and survey characteristics like age, sex, and whether the survey was telephone or in-person; Z i is an indicator for whether child i won the voucher lottery; and δ c is a cohort effect.
The coefficient of interest is α 0 . We estimate (1) using three sets of control variables: "no controls", i.e., excluding the X i variables; "basic controls" including the X i variables; and "basic plus barrio controls" which includes the X i variables plus 19 neighborhood dummies in the Bogota-95 sample.
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A. Effects on Scholarship Use and School Choice
We begin with a simple analysis of the effect of winning the lottery on private school scholarship receipt and the choice between public and private school. The most immediate effect of the lottery was to increase the likelihood of receiving a private school scholarship. This can be seen in the first row of Table   3 , which shows that at the time of our survey, voucher winners were 51 percentage points more likely than losers to have been using some kind of scholarship. Not all winners were using their PACES vouchers in the survey year. This is because 15% of winners were not in school at all, and another 16% were in public schools, and therefore ineligible for scholarships. Some lottery winners also lost their voucher after repeating a grade (7%), while 5% switched to non-participating private schools or failed to complete the paperwork for a transfer. Others attended schools that stopped accepting vouchers or lost their vouchers for unreported reasons. Just as not all winners were using a scholarship, some losers obtained scholarships from programs other than PACES and one loser was awarded a PACES voucher after re-applying the following year.
At the time of the survey, enrollment rates were .83 for losers and .85 for winners in the Bogota-95 sample, an insignificant difference. The estimates in Table 3 also show that most PACES applicants entered 6 th grade in a private secondary school, and most finished 6 th grade whether or not they won a voucher. But lottery winners were 6-7 percentage points more likely than losers to have begun 6 th grade in private school, and 15-16 percentage points more likely to be in private school at the time of our survey. The effect of winning the PACES lottery on the probability of private school attendance was even larger in 7 th grade, probably because losers were more likely to have left private school by then.
These results suggest the decision between public and private school was sensitive to variation in the price of private school induced by the program, while the decision whether to attend school was not. 9 This is consistent with a model in which those households most willing and able to pay for education attend private school; a middle group attends public school; and those least willing or able to pay do not attend at all. In this 10 PACES subsidies were initially large enough to cover the entire cost of private school, and may have shifted recipients from no school to private school when the program started. However, the voucher value was later eroded by inflation.
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case, no one is on the private school/no school margin, and so small subsidies to private education do not directly increase overall enrollment. 10 Since many public schools in Colombia were turning away applicants due to overcrowding, PACES is likely to have opened up places in public school for other pupils by reducing public-school queuing.
B. Effects on Schooling
Lottery winners completed more schooling than losers, and were less likely to repeat grades. For example, lottery losers had completed 7.5 years of schooling at the time of our survey, but winners in the 1995 Bogota sample completed an additional .12-.16 years (.8 years in the full sample). As noted earlier, there was no statistically significant effect on enrollment. The effect on years of schooling and the lack of an effect on enrollment is primarily the result of a reduced probability of grade repetition for winners. This is reflected in a sharp increase in the likelihood lottery winners had finished 8 th grade as of the survey date, with a smaller impact on 7 th grade completion. In the Bogota-95 sample, over 20% of losers had repeated a grade since beginning 6 th grade, and almost 20% repeated 6 th grade. But the probability of grade repetition was reduced by 5-6 percentage points for lottery winners.
The estimates of α 0 change little as the list of control variables changes, a result to be expected since the voucher lottery was random. The estimation results are also similar in the Bogota-95 and full samples, and are largely invariant to the inclusion of neighborhood effects. Estimates and standard errors for the Bogota 1995 sample also change little in models with school effects.
Separate results by sex, reported in Table 4 , show moderately larger effects on educational attainment for girls, though the pattern of sex differences in the effects on private school enrollment are not clear cut.
Results for the Bogota-95 sample show male lottery winners with an insignificant 0.12 more years of schooling while female lottery winners obtained 0.14 years more of schooling, a statistically significant effect. 11 There is little evidence that the effect of winning the voucher varied with applicants' socioeconomic strata of residence or parents' education. However, estimates for subgroups are imprecise. 12 For example, Psacharopolous and Velez (1993) and Harbison and Hanushek (1992) use repetition rates as a measure of school quality in Colombia and Brazil.
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Differences by sex are more pronounced in the full sample, with an insignificant 0.06 more years of schooling for boys, and a statistically significant 0.12 more years of schooling for girls. It should also be noted that while effects for boys are almost entirely due to grade repetition, the effects for girls appear to come from both reduced grade repetition and additional time spent in school. 11
The greater probability of 8 th grade completion and lower repetition rates for lottery winners seem like desirable outcomes. In fact, high rates of grade repetition in Latin America are widely seen as symptomatic of poorly functioning public schools. 12 But the interpretation of these effects is complicated by the fact that pupils who failed a grade were supposed to forfeit PACES vouchers. Private schools may therefore have had an incentive to promote pupils with vouchers even if their performance did not meet normal promotional standards. To explore this possibility, we look at effects on test scores and non-educational outcomes in the next section.
IV. Effects on Test Scores and Non-Education Outcomes

A. Effects on Test Scores
We tested children from the 1995 applicant cohort in three Bogota neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were chosen because they had relatively large numbers of winners and losers, and because of the availability of suitable testing sites. The tests were administered in 1999, approximately one year after our household survey. The test sample was drawn from applicants for whom we had survey data. Participants were solicited by telephone, followed by hand delivery of letters describing the purpose of the test and inviting pupils to be tested. Those who failed to appear on the test day were invited again for a second testing, except at the last sitting. To encourage participation, refreshments were provided at each site, and each test concluded with the raffle of a bicycle and other prizes. Pupils were also given 5 or 10 thousand pesos (US 13 $3.23 or $6.45) to cover travel costs. The invitation letter noted the offer of refreshments, travel reimbursement, and raffle. See the data appendix for additional details on the testing set-up.
Our evaluation used La Prueba de Realizacion, a grade-specific multiple-choice achievement test for native Spanish speakers, published by Riverside. We administered only the mathematics, reading, and writing subtests, each taking about 30 minutes. This test was chosen because Colombian educators participated in test development and the test had been used previously in Colombia (Cole et al, 1993 ). An appendix table compares test results from the Hispanic-American test-norming populations for grades 9 and 10 with the results from our test. Colombian 9th graders scored lower than American pupils in mathematics, but they had reading skills slightly better than American 10th graders. The average Colombian writing score was close to the average score for American 10th graders.
The Test Sample
The pupils invited to be tested were not a random sample, but they have characteristics similar to those in the full Bogota 1995 sample. This can be seen in the first two columns of Table 5 , which describe the characteristics of all 1,176 Bogota 1995 applicants surveyed, and the 473 applicants invited for testing.
Of those invited, 283 were tested, a response rate of 60%. Those tested were younger, and came from a poorer background as measured by father's education and wages, than the no-shows. Importantly, however, there is no significant relationship between the probability of being tested and voucher status. Also encouraging is the fact that, conditional on taking the test, there is little evidence of differences in personal characteristics between winners and losers. Differences by voucher status are reported in column 5 of Table 5 . Table 6 reports estimates of the effect of winning the voucher lottery on test scores. Columns 1 and 13 The results in column 1 and 3 are from models that include site dummies only. The results in columns 2 and 4 are from models that include controls for age, sex, parents' schooling, strata of residence, type of interview, and survey form.
Test results
14 2 of Table 6 show results from models with and without covariates. 13 Columns 3 and 4 present the results of estimating a single voucher coefficient for stacked subject results, in models with a pupil random effect. That is, we estimated:
where y is is pupil i's score in subject s, and δ i is a random effect used to adjust standard errors for the fact that there is likely to be within-pupil correlation across subjects. Note that test score results are reported in standard deviation units.
Lottery winners scored just over .2 standard deviations more than lottery losers, though this difference is (not surprisingly, given the small test sample) only marginally significant. According to US norms for La Prueba, 2/10 of a standard deviation is roughly the score gain associated with one additional school year (Cole et al, 1993) . This effect should probably therefore be seen as large, in view of the fact that subjects were tested three years after applying to the program. Lottery winners also scored higher on all subtests, though the only significant difference is for reading scores (t=1.8). The results for the stacked subjects, reported in columns 3 and 4, also show marginally significantly higher scores for lottery winners, with the largest effects for models that stack math and reading scores only.
Models estimated separately for boys and girls generate larger and more precise effects for girls than boys. For example, the estimated effect on total points for girls, reported in column 2 of Panel B for models with covariates, is .26 (s.e.=.12). The corresponding estimate for boys, reported in Panel C, is .17 (s.e.=.18).
The finding of a stronger effect on girls echoes some of the survey results.
Earlier we noted that the fact that lottery winners were less likely to repeat grades may have been due to a reduction in promotion standards for lottery winners, as well as any increased learning or change in school quality. Further evidence that the grade repetition results are not due solely to schools' lowering the bar for promotion of winners is provided by comparing the test scores of winners and losers who were promoted.
14 Suppose schools promote if a random variable x is greater than a cutoff c, which takes on two values, c W for winners and c L for losers. Suppose c W < c L , but test scores, T, and the variable x are unaffected by winning the lottery. Then the expected test score for lottery losers who are promoted is E(T| x > c L ). The expected score for winners will be a weighted average of this and E(T| c W < x < c L ). Average scores for promoted losers will therefore exceed average scores for promoted winners as long as E(T| x) is increasing in x.
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To see this, suppose that both test scores and grade promotion depend on underlying learning, but the program itself had no effect on achievement. This scenario can be shown to imply that if promotion standards are relaxed for winners, then average test scores for lottery winners who are promoted should be lower than average test scores for lottery losers who are promoted. 14 In practice, the composite test scores of winners who were promoted are about .14 standard deviations greater than the scores of promoted losers, although the difference is not significant. Table 7 reports estimates of the effect of winning the lottery on non-educational outcomes.
B. Other Outcomes
Approximately 1.6% of lottery losers from Bogota were married or living with a companion, a low proportion consistent with the fact that the average age of survey respondents was about 15. Since this outcome is rare, we estimated probit models as well as linear probability models.
Both probit marginal effects and OLS estimates suggest that marriage and cohabitation were reduced for lottery winners, a marginally significant effect. There is also some evidence from the pooled sample that lottery winners were less likely to be working than losers, with the largest effects in Bogota. There is also a significant difference in hours worked. In particular, lottery winners worked 1.2 fewer hours per week than losers. This effect is larger and more precisely estimated for girls. The reduction in work may be due to income effects for the household, the greater time demands of private school relative to public school, or increased incentives for lottery winners to spend time studying so as to avoid failing a grade and losing the PACES voucher.
V. Instrumental Variables Estimates of Scholarship Effects
The analysis so far focuses on reduced form effects of winning the lottery. In the discussion of Table   3 , however, we noted that some lottery losers were awarded other scholarships, while some winners failed to use or retain their PACES scholarships. This section reports 2SLS estimates of the effect of ever receiving any scholarship using voucher win/loss status as an instrumental variable (IV). While only 6% of lottery losers used a scholarship at the time of the survey, 24% had used a scholarship at some point. In contrast, 90% of winners used a scholarship at some time. The 2SLS estimates based on this difference are necessarily larger than the reduced form effects of winning the lottery since winning the lottery is only imperfectly correlated with receiving a scholarship.
The assumption that a scholarship use dummy satisfies an exclusion restriction in an instrumental variables (IV) setup motivates 2SLS estimation of the equation:
where s i is a dummy for scholarship use, and X i is the vector of "basic controls" used in previous tables. The associated first-stage relationship using Z i as an instrument is
The estimate of π is about .66 (s.e.=.021), so the second-stage estimates can be expected to be about 50% larger than the corresponding reduced form estimates. The interpretation of α 1 in this case is as an approximate effect of treatment on the subset of scholarship users who would not have used a scholarship without PACES (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) .
The 2SLS estimate of the effect of scholarship use on highest grade completed is about .2 in the Bogota-95 sample and .13 in the full sample. These estimates are reported in Table 8 . 2SLS estimates of voucher effects on the probability of finishing eighth grade are 13-15 percentage points, nearly a 25% increase in completion rates. This is large by the standards of the literature on the enrollment effects of financial aid for college (see, e.g., Fuller, Manski, and Wise, 1982; Kane, 1995) , though we know of no comparable results for subsidies to private secondary schools. Another interesting result is the 2SLS estimate of the effect on test scores, .29, somewhat smaller than the corresponding OLS estimate. The 2SLS estimates are likely to be more useful for predicting the impact of scholarship programs on new scholarship recipients than are the reduced form effects, which are diluted by take-up rates less than one and the availability of alternative financing.
VI. Impact on Household and Government Expenditure
This section discusses the impact of the program on household and government budgets. We begin by showing that approximately 70% of voucher funds flowed to education, with the remainder going to educational spending that households would have made without the voucher. Taking into account the reduction in work by lottery winners suggests that winning the lottery induced households to devote more net resources to education. The higher fees paid by voucher winners are due primarily to winners' greater likelihood of attending private school. However, there is also some evidence that applicants who would have attended private schools anyway traded up to more expensive private schools in response to winning the voucher. Since the voucher did not reduce the cost of private school at the margin, this result weighs against the simplest models of education as human capital investment without credit constraints. The results in section B suggest that it cost the government about $24 more per lottery winner to provide school places through PACES than through the public system. Finally, section C aggregates the impact on households, schools, and the government budget, arguing that the total social costs of providing additional school places through the PACES voucher system were small, and therefore dwarfed by the benefits of the program to participants. The analysis in this section uses data for the 1995 Bogota applicant cohort only.
A. Impact on Household Educational Expenditure Three years after the 1995 lottery in Bogota, about 55% of winners and 5% of losers were still receiving scholarships (a result from Table 3 repeated in the first row of Table 9 for the sample of observations with usable fee data). As noted earlier, 53% of losers were still in private school in the survey 15 The estimated displacement of private expenditure is even lower when a more comprehensive expenditure measure is used. Lottery winners report an estimated $84 more in comprehensive scholarship assistance (i.e., including expenditure on uniforms and textbooks) and an extra $74 more in comprehensive educational expenditure. 16 Conditional on working, the average daily wage in our sample is $5.71. We estimate the hourly wage assuming a 7hour work day.
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year, with an increase of about 15% for winners.
Among applicants to the Bogota 95 lottery, winners received an average of $74 more in scholarship aid than losers, result reported in the fourth row of Table 9 . Conditional on receiving a scholarship, scholarship amounts were similar for winners and losers, at roughly $200. The estimates in Table 9 Aside from paying for school fees, households bear the opportunity cost of the effort students devote to education. The estimates for non-educational outcomes in Table 7 suggest lottery winners spent 1.2 fewer hours working each week. According to our survey data, the average hourly wage was 71 cents. 16 Assuming that students work 48 weeks per year, this reduction corresponds to an opportunity cost of 1.2 x $.71 x 48
weeks, approximately $41. Combining the increase of $52 in expenditures on fees and the $41 of lost earnings, we estimate that PACES lottery winners devoted $93 more to education than losers in the survey
year, or 126% of the $74 in extra scholarship assistance they received.
Disaggregating Effects on Fees
While winning households spent about $52 more on school fees, on average, this average conceals important heterogeneity. Since vouchers covered only part of the cost of private school, families with children who were induced to switch to private school increased their educational expenditure sharply. However, most of the applicants who lost the lottery started private school in 6 th grade anyway, and over half were still in 17 To see this, note that if education is pure human capital investment, people choose schools so that a school costing one dollar more generates exactly one more dollar of present discounted earnings. For people who would in any case have attended a school costing more than $190, the voucher does not affect this first order condition. This implies a total effect of $49, which is less than $52 because of the approximation used to simplify (5), with $43 due to school switching. Thus, in an accounting sense, the bulk of the change in household expenditure can be attributed to increased private school enrollment. However, for reasons discussed below, this decomposition provides an incomplete picture of the causal effect of the program on the fee distribution.
Causal effects on fees for families who would have sent their children to private school anyway are difficult to measure since we do not know who these families are. Simply comparing fees by win/loss status conditional on private school attendance (the second term in (5), above) leads to a biased estimate that is almost certainly too low. To see this, let F 0 be the public or private fee a pupil would pay if he or she loses the lottery and let F 1 be the public or private fee he or she would pay if he or she wins, and let R 0 and R 1 denote private school attendance if a pupil loses or wins the lottery respectively. Similarly, let f 0 be the private school fee a pupil would pay if he or she loses the lottery and let f 1 be the private school fee a pupil would pay if he or she wins. Thus f 0 = F 0 ×R 0 and f 1 = F 1 ×R 1 . We imagine that these variables are defined for every pupil, though in practice, we can only observe F 0 , R 0 , and f 0 for losers and F 1 , R 1 , and f 1 for winners. E[f 1f 0 | f 0 >0] is the effect on fees for those who would attend private school even if they were to lose the lottery.
The observed contrast in fees for private school pupils can be written as follows
19 This is easy to show in a model where f 1 =h(f 0 ) for any increasing transformation. More generally, winners who attend private school only if they win probably attend cheaper private schools than those who attend regardless in a variety of plausible models. Suppose, for example, that school quality complements ability and higher quality schools are more expensive. Then low-ability children attend public schools if they lose the lottery and attend cheap private schools if they win the lottery, while high-ability children attend expensive private schools whether or not they win a voucher. Alternatively, consider a model with credit constraints in which the poor attend public school; the rich attend private school; and the very rich attend expensive private schools. Then lottery winners who would have attended public school if they lost the lottery will attend cheaper schools than lottery winners who would have attended private school even if they lost.
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The term in curly brackets comes from selection bias in the conditional-on-positive contrast. Under mild assumptions, this term is negative. 19 Assuming, as seems likely, that f 1 $f 0 , the left hand side therefore is a lower bound on the causal effect, E[f 1 -f 0 | f 0 >0].
The parameter E[f 1 -f 0 | f 0 >0] is not identified without further assumptions (see, e.g., Chamberlain, 1986) , though the previous discussion suggests we can treat the observed contrast in fees for private school students as a lower bound. Under mild assumptions, we can obtain a reasonably tight upper bound on this and a related family of parameters: E[f 1 -f 0 | f 0 >m 0 (θ)] where m 0 (θ) is the θ-quantile of the losers' fee distribution. By choosing m 0 (θ)=0, we bound E[f 1 -f 0 | f 0 >0], while picking points at higher quantiles, we measure the effect on those who would have spent more on private schooling in the absence of the lottery.
For example, we can bound the effect of winning the lottery on private school fees for those who would have spent more than the voucher amount ($190) on private school fees in the absence of the lottery. This result is stated formally below:
Proposition. Suppose that F 1 $ F 0 . Let m 0 (θ) be the θ quantile of the distribution F for losers, with m 1 (θ) defined similarly for winners. Then 
Proof. Define F M = F 0 1(F 0 # m 0 (θ)) + F 0 1(F 0 >m 0 (θ), R 0 =0) + F 1 1(F 0 >m 0 (θ), R 0 =1). Note that F M = F 1 for households above the quantile who would have attended private schools anyway. Otherwise, F M = F 0 . So F 1
Note that
Therefore,
Since f 0 =R 0 F 0 , this implies
which is the quantity we seek to bound. Also, since F 1 $F M $F 0 for all applicants, To see why the upper bound works in the case where θ=0, note that E(F M -F 0 ) is the average difference between winners' and losers' fees due to households who would have attended private schools in any case trading up to more expensive private schools. This is less than the observed difference in total fee payments by win/loss status, E(F 1 -F 0 ). The econometric intuition for this result is that in parametric sample selection models, controlling for the probability of sample selection eliminates selection bias. Comparing winners and losers at the same quantiles equalizes the "probability of selection" if F 1 = h(F 0 ) for some monotone increasing transformation, h(). In fact, with no public school fees, the bound is exact when F 1 = h(F 0 ). More generally, dividing by P[R=1| Z=0, F>m 0 (θ)] corrects for the fact that some of those with positive fees were attending public school, and the bound applies even without a deterministic link between F 0 and F 1 .
Estimates of (6) are reported in Table 10 , along with a lower bound using the biased comparison for quantiles analogous to (6), i.e., E[F| Z=1,R=1]F>m 0 (θ)]-E[F| Z=0,R=1]F>m 0 (θ)]. As noted earlier, this is a plausible lower bound because of negative selection bias. Note also that any reasonable behavioral model would predict that a family that spent less than the voucher amount on private school without a voucher would spend more after the voucher. We therefore focus on bounding effects that are conditional on paying pre-23 voucher fees equal to at least the voucher amount, roughly $190.
Among losers paying at least $190 in fees, the average fee was $371. Almost all of these pupils were in private school (in fact, some reports of public school fees above $190 are probably in error; others refer to a handful of elite public schools that charge significant fees 
Price discrimination by private schools
Another potential source of increased expenditure on fees by winners is price discrimination. There is little evidence that private schools discriminated by charging more to applicants with PACES scholarships.
The easiest way for schools to price discriminate was to offer scholarships to those less likely to be able to afford education at the full price, i.e., applicants without PACES vouchers. In practice, however, we found little evidence of price discrimination. Our survey indicates that roughly 6% of losers in private school received a school scholarship, while 3% of winners in private school received a school scholarship. This is a small and insignificant difference. Per lottery winner, i.e., without conditioning on attending private school, the difference is only about 1%.
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B. Impact on the Government Budget
The PACES program was established in part to expand secondary school enrollment without using the public system. We estimate that the program increased public educational expenditure by about $24 per lottery winner, relative to the cost of accommodating these pupils in public school. As discussed in Section III, winners were no more likely than losers to attend school, but the program probably did expand overall school enrollment by freeing up places in public schools as lottery winners transferred to private schools.
To see where the $24 figure comes from, note that the probability of attending public school, reported in 
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The comparison of costs and benefits should take account of the fact that three years of costs were incurred prior to our survey. The total cost of the program can therefore be estimated by multiplying the annual resource cost times the roughly 3 years winners received vouchers, for a total of about 3×24 = $72 in additional public educational expenditure and 3×$43=$129 in total societal resource cost. Actual costs are probably somewhat higher, however, since voucher take-up rates declined over time, with 88% of winners having ever used a voucher, and only 49% using it in the survey year. Multiplying costs by 88%/49% for the first and second years yields an upper bound on the three-year cost of the program of about $195 using the $43/year figure for social costs.
These costs are very likely small relative to the benefits for participants. Although lottery winners gave up current earnings, they completed an additional .12-.16 grades and scored approximately .2 standard deviations higher on tests. Among US Hispanic students who took the same test, the difference in test scores between 7 th and 8 th graders, or between 8 th and 9 th graders, was also about .2 standard deviations, so the achievement gain from winning the lottery may be as large as that associated with a full year of schooling.
Our estimates using a recent Colombian labor force survey show returns to schooling of about 10%. If the gain from the program is only the economic return to an additional 0.12 years of schooling, the program raised winners' wages by 1.2% per year, whereas if it is equal to that from a full year of schooling it raised wages by 10%. Annual earnings of parents in our sample were about $2,400 per worker, and PACES applicants should be able to earn more, since the average parent had only 5.9 years of education while the average applicant had already completed 7.5 years and was still in school at the time of our survey. We therefore assume the expected earnings of applicants are $3000. Thus, PACES seems very likely to raise lottery winners' wages by $36 per year, and might raise wages by as much as $300 per year if higher test scores have a grade-equivalent payoff. Discounted over applicants working lives, these benefits easily outweigh the social costs of the voucher program, which are probably no more than $195.
A more complete cost-benefit analysis would take into account the program's effects on nonparticipants. Pupils left behind in public schools may have been hurt by the departure of motivated classmates for private schools, or alternatively, public schools may have responded positively to increased competition, a possibility considered by Hoxby (2000) and Bettinger (2001b) . Such general equilibrium effects cannot be assessed by comparing lottery winners and losers. But since the partial equilibrium cost-benefit analysis is clear-cut, and since only 15% of winners moved from public to private schools, any negative external effects on non-participants would have to have been extraordinarily large to outweigh program benefits.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
Colombia's PACES program provides an unusual opportunity to assess the effect of demand-side education financing in a Latin American country where private schools educate a substantial fraction of pupils. The PACES program is of special interest because many vouchers were assigned by lottery, so program effects can be reliably assessed. Our results suggest that lottery winners benefitted from higher educational attainment, primarily as a consequence of reduced grade repetition, as well as from higher test scores and a lower probability of teen cohabitation or employment. Most of the results suggest PACES vouchers had a stronger effect on the education of girls than on the education of boys.
PACES vouchers affected outcomes through a number of channels. First, lottery winners were more likely to have attended participating private schools, and these schools may be better than public schools.
Moreover, because voucher recipients who failed a grade risked losing vouchers, lottery winners had an incentive to devote more effort to school. Finally, vouchers may have allowed some households who would have chosen private schools in any case to attend more expensive private schools. The net effect is such that the benefit of voucher awards were more than enough to offset the costs. In work in progress, we are assessing longer term consequences of voucher receipt, and hope to be able to document effects on secondary school completion rates. An implication of our findings to date is that demand-side programs like PACES can be a cost-effective way to increase educational attainment and academic achievement, at least in countries like Colombia with a weak public school infrastructure and a well-developed private education sector.
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DATA APPENDIX
Surveys
The sampling frame for the surveys were the lists of PACES winners and losers obtained from ICETEX offices. We selected applicants at random from these lists. Those with phones were interviewed first. Applicants were called up to 9 times total and 3 times/day to obtain an interview, with numbers of contacts similar for winners and losers. In general, we interviewed parents or guardians and not the applicants themselves. Some interviewing was conducted in person; household interviews are distinguished by the inclusion of a dummy in the estimation. We developed a pilot survey that was used to test questions and interviewing strategies. The pilot survey ultimately differed little from the main survey so pilot responses are included in the data set analyzed here and indicated by a survey-form dummy included in the analyses.
Interviewers were college students attending Javierna University De Colombia, in Bogota. The interviewers were selected and trained by one of us (Bloom). Responsibility for interviewing later passed to two of the most experienced interviewers. Surveys were checked and coded by the interviewers, but interviewers did not code their own interviews. Responses were also checked by a research assistant in Boston. We tried to blind interviewers to the win/loss status of respondents for as long as possible, and had each interviewer collect data from applicants in both groups.
Testing
There were four test dates. On the first, we tested applicants from Suba; on the second, we tested Suba no-shows; on the third date, we tested applicants from La Candelaria and downtown areas nearby.
Finally, on the last date we tested third-date no-shows, plus applicants from the Ciudad Bolivar neighborhood and surrounding areas.
Sample sizes and response rates were as follows. 473 applicants were invited for testing, 283 (60%)
were tested. Response rates at individual test sites were as follows: 77 Suba applicants were invited, 50
(65%) were tested on dates 1 or 2, one subject did not do the math test; 109 Candalaria applicants were 28 invited, 83 (76%) were tested on dates 3 or 4; 287 Ciudad Bolivar applicants were invited and one showed up uninvited, 150 (52%) were tested on date 4. Response rates were higher at the first two sites because noshows had more than one opportunity to be tested. Test score means and pupil characteristics were similar across sites. Site-specific treatment effects were not significantly different from zero.
Scores are reported in the tables as the standardized (mean zero, standard deviation 1) number right.
The standardization uses means and standard deviations in sample of test takers. The appendix table presents a comparison of our test scores with those for the La Prueba norming population. shows the differences between students who took the exam and students who were invited to the exam and did not attend. Column 5 shows the difference between lottery winners and losers who took the exam. Notes: Results are for a sample with non-missing non-educational and educational outcomes. Columns 2 and 3 show results from models that include whether applicant had access to a phone, age, gender, type of survey and instrument, strata of residence, and month of interview. Columns 5 and 6 also include controls for city and year of application. Notes: Results are from models that control for city, year of application, whether applicant had access to a phone, age, type of survey and instrument, strata of residence, and month of interview. The outcome "Finished 8 th " in the combined sample does not include applicants to the Bogota 1997 voucher lottery. In the outcome "Test Scores -Total Points," the sample is restricted to those individuals who took the exam. In the 2sls specification, the endogenous regressor used scholarship is instrumented with a voucher win/loss dummy. Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses in columns 1 and 4. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses in all other columns. Sample sizes differ from other tables because of missing fee data. The sample sizes differ slightly across rows because of missing data for "Currently Using Scholarship from the Private School" and the outcomes with the more comprehensive fee measure. The regression estimates in columns 3 and 6 are from models that include controls for whether applicant has phone, age, type of survey and instrument, strata of residence, and month of interview. Standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns 5 and 6. The upper bound above a given percentile is computed in a two-step process. First, we estimate the difference between winners' and losers' matriculation fees conditional on being greater than the given quantile in their respective distributions. Second, we divide this difference by the probability that losers above the given percentile attend private school. The lower is computed by taking the differences between winners' and losers' fees conditional on private school attendance and conditional on being greater than the cutoff. See text and appendix for further details.
Appendix The US-Norming population included 8851 students in grades K-12 from all states. Ninetyfive percent of the students were from Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, or Texas. The Colombia-PACES results are based on 283 applicants to the 1995 Bogota lottery, tested between June and November of 1999.
